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Abstract
As an important branch of quantum secure multiparty computation, quantum private comparison (QPC) has 
attracted more and more attention recently. In this paper, according to the quantum implementation mecha‑
nism that these protocols used, we divide these protocols into three categories: The quantum cryptography 
QPC, the superdense coding QPC, and the entanglement swapping QPC. And then, a more in‑depth analy‑
sis on the research progress, design idea, and substantive characteristics of corresponding QPC categories 
is carried out, respectively. Finally, the applications of QPC and quantum secure multi‑party computation 
issues are discussed and, in addition, three possible research mainstream directions are pointed out.
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1. Introduction
Secure multi‑party computation (SMC) is a basic topic 
in the distributed computation field, which allows a 
group of mutually distrustful players to perform cor‑
rect, distributed computations without leaking their 
respective secret inputs under the sole assumption 
that some of them will follow the protocol honestly. 
The Millionaire problem introduced by Yao [1] was 
the origin of secure two‑party computation, in which 
two millionaires wish to know who is richer without 
revealing the precise amount of their fortunes. Based 
on Yao’s millionaires problem, Boudot et al. [2] subse‑
quently proposed a protocol to decide whether two mil‑
lionaires are equally rich. However, Lo [3] pointed out 
that the equality function cannot be securely evaluated 
with a two‑party scenario. Therefore, some additional 
assumptions (e.g., a semi‑honest third party) should 
be considered to reach the goal of private comparison. 
SMC problem has been studied extensively in the 
classical setting, but the security is based on compu‑
tational complexity assumptions, so it is conditionally 
secure. With the improvement of computation power 
and presentation of novel algorithms, especially the 
appearance of quantum computer and quantum algo‑
rithms, some classic NP‑complete problems have been 
being constantly broken; therefore, those protocols 
based on computational complexity encounter serious 
challenges. Different from classical counterpart, secure 
computation in the quantum mechanism can attain 
unconditional security because the security is ensured 
by some physical principles, such as the Heisenberg 
uncertainty principle and the quantum no‑cloning theo‑
rem. Under this background, making use of quantum 
mechanical effect [4] to solve SMC problem has been 
attracting more and more attention.
As an important branch of quantum secure multi‑party 
computation (QSMC), quantum private compari‑
son (QPC) [5‑16] has been extensively discussed and 
studied, it can be applied extensively in many applica‑
tion fields, including private bidding and auctions, secret 
ballot elections, commercial business, identification in a 
number of scenarios, and so on. Being a QPC protocol, 
it must ensure:
• Fairness: The protocol is fair, which means that one 
party knows the sound result of comparison result if 
and only if the other parties know the sound result
• Security: Outside parties cannot learn any informa‑
tion about players’ private inputs, and they cannot 
deduce their secret inputs from the comparison result, 
moreover, one player cannot know the other’s secret 
input
• Efficiency: With the help of the TP, the protocol 
should save more quantum and classical resources 
in contrast to the case without the TP.
In most previous QPC protocols, TP is assumed to be 
semi‑honest, i.e., he/she will help the parties accom‑
plish the comparison and executes the protocol loyally, 
but takes a record of all intermediate computations and 
might try to steal the information from the record. The 
point to be mentioned is that TP will not be corrupted 
by an outside eavesdropper.
In QPC protocols, “the private information is equal or 
not” is usually taken as the comparison result, the detailed 
description of a two‑party QPC problem is as follows:
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Input: Alice has a private information x, Bob has a pri‑
vate information y. The binary representations of x and 
y are (x0, x1,…, xN − 1), (y0, y1,…, yN − 1), where xi, yi∈{0,1};
x xi
i
i
N
=
=
−∑ 20
1
, y yi
i
i
N
=
=
−∑ 20
1
, 2N − 1 ≤ max {x, y}≤2N
Output: x = y or x ≠ y.
According to quantum mechanism that the QPC proto‑
cols utilize, we can divide them into three categories: The 
quantum cryptography QPC [5,6], the superdense coding 
QPC [7‑13], and the entanglement swapping QPC [14‑16]. 
Using quantum cryptography to deal with private compari‑
son is one of the most common ways, which uses quantum 
states to transfer encryption keys, and then takes these keys 
to encrypt private information. The superdense coding 
QPC introduces some unitary operators to encode private 
information into quantum states, and deduces the private 
comparison results by measuring the final quantum state. 
Different from the above two, the advantage of entangle‑
ment swapping QPC is that all particles carrying the secret 
messages only need the one‑way transmission, so it is easier 
to be implemented in the quantum one‑way computer.
The structure of this paper is organized as follows, in 
Section 2, the research progress, design idea and sub‑
stantive characteristics of quantum cryptography QPC 
are elaborated and analyzed in depth; the same elabo‑
ration and analysis on the superdense coding QPC and 
the entanglement swapping QPC are done in Section 3, 
Section 4 respectively. At last, the applications of QPC 
and other QSMC are discussed, and three research direc‑
tions are pointed out as well in Section 5.
2. Quantum Cryptography QPC
Using quantum cryptography to design QPC protocols 
may be a usual way to be chosen. In 2010, Chen et al. [5] 
proposed a quantum cryptography QPC protocol via 
triplet GHZ (Greenberger‑Horne‑Zeilinger) states. 
However, Lin et al. [17] pointed out that one can retrieve 
other’s secret information by means of intercept‑resend 
attack [18], because the positions of checking particles 
or the measurement basis are determined by the partici‑
pants in the eavesdropping check phase. Moreover, they 
gave two solutions to avoid this attack, i.e., they let the 
third‑party determine the positions and the measure‑
ment basis. In order to improve qubit efficiency, in 2012, 
Tseng et al. [6] proposed quantum cryptography QPC 
protocol using Bell state, which is easier to be achieved 
in the physical experiment, and its qubit efficiency is 
near 50%. However, Yang et al. [19] pointed out that if 
the third‑party is disloyal, Tseng et al. protocol has an 
obvious security flaw: TP can know the two players’ 
private information. In order to make up this flaw, Yang 
suggested that it should add a loyal checking procedure 
for the third‑party after transmission security detection.
Taking the triplet GHZ states as quantum resource, let 
us briefly introduce how to realize the quantum cryp‑
tography QPC [Figure 1].
Step 1. Suppose that two players Alice, Bob and the 
third‑party TP agree that |+〉 (|−〉) represents infor‑
mation ‘0’(‘1’). TP prepares N triplet GHZ states as 
follows:
Ψ = +( )
= + + + + + − − + − + − + − − +( )
1
2
000 111
1
2 2
,  (1)
And then, he/she sends the first (second) particles 
sequence to Alice (Bob) and retains the third particles 
sequence.
Step 2. In order to ensure the quantum channel security, 
Alice and Bob need to perform an eavesdropping check 
procedure. After that, they make single‑particle measure‑
ment in the X‑basis {|+〉,|−〉} on the remaining particles, 
and obtain the encryption key KA, KB, respectively. 
Now, Alice and Bob can encrypt their secret messages 
as follows, CA = x⊕KA, CB = y⊕KB, and then compute 
C = CA⊕ CB. Finally, C is sent to TP.
Step 3. If the ith value in C is ‘1’, TP performs unitary 
operation σZ=(|0〉 〈0|−|1〉 〈1|) on the ith qubit of the 
TP’s retaining sequence. If not, TP does nothing.
Step 4. TP performs the X‑basis measurement on the par‑
ticles on his/her hand, if any |−〉 exists in the measuring 
result, we know x ≠ y; otherwise, x = y.
Figure 1: Process of the quantum cryptography QPC.
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The essence of quantum encryption QPC is to use 
quantum state to transfer encryption keys (the phase 
is equivalent to the QKD protocol [20,21]), then utilize 
these keys to encrypt secret messages, finally make some 
exclusive‑OR operations to judge whether the secret mes‑
sage is equal or not. Since QKD protocol has been proven 
to be unconditionally secure [22,23], it means that other 
parties can’t gain any information of the secret message 
from encrypted text. Compared with other types of QPC, 
the quantum cryptography QPC is simpler and easier in 
the physical implementation.
3. Superdense Coding QPC
Quantum superdense coding [24] is an important applica‑
tion in quantum computation and quantum information 
fields. In contrast to the classic coding, the advantage is 
the high efficiency: It can transmit two classical bits of 
information by only sending one quantum bit. In 2009, 
Yang et al. [7] proposed the pioneering superdense coding 
QPC protocol using Bell states, which utilizes four unitary 
operations (I, x, Z, iy) to encode information. After‑
wards, for the sake of saving the qubit, Yang et al. [8] pre‑
sented a novel QPC protocol employing single photons. 
In the protocol, they utilize the I/x operations to encode 
information, and use decoy photons to detect outsider’s 
cheating. In Ref. [9], Liu et al. proposed another single 
photon QPC protocol by introducing QKD and the Hash 
function to encrypt secret messages. In order to avoid 
inserting repeatedly the decoy photons and performing 
the step‑by‑step channel detection, they use the collective 
detection to reduce the photon consumption and simplify 
the protocol steps. In addition, some researches have been 
done on non‑maximally entangled state QPC. In 2011, Liu 
et al. [10] proposed a superdense coding QPC protocol 
based on triplet W states. However, Li et al. [11] pointed 
out that one player can estimate the other’s private bit 
successfully with probability 2/3, rather than 1/2. And 
then, they presented a secure protocol using Bell states 
instead of W states, but it is a pity that they did not find 
an effective solution with W states. Recently, in order to 
improve the efficiency, Jia et al. [12] put forward a QPC 
protocol based on four‑particle χ‑Type states. Due to no 
need to publish any message after operations encoding, 
the efficiency of the protocol is equal to 100%. At the 
same time, Liu et al. [13] proposed another QPC protocol 
utilizing four‑particle χ‑Type states. Different from Jia’s 
protocol, it only needs to prepare one type of χ‑type state, 
and the amount of χ‑type states is only N, which saves 
more quantum resources.
The χ‑Type is defined as follows:
χ 00
1234
1234
1
2
00 11 01 10
=
+ − +( )+ − − +Φ Φ Ψ Ψ ,  (2)
where,
Φ± = ±( )1
2
00 11 ,  Ψ± = ±( )1
2
01 10 .  (3)
Let us give a brief description on the superdense coding 
QPC protocol using χ‑Type states, [Figure 2].
Step 1. Suppose that Alice and Bob agree | 0〉, |Φ±〉 rep‑
resent information ‘0’; |1〉, |Ψ±〉represent information ‘1’. 
TP prepares N χ‑Type states and sends the first (second) 
particles sequence to Alice (Bob), he/she retains the 
third, four particles sequence in hand.
Step 2. After Alice and Bob received sequences, they 
perform eavesdropping check. After that, Alice and 
Bob perform Pauli operation on the received particles 
according to their secret message. If secret message is 
‘1’, x=(|0〉 〈1|+|〉 〈0|) operation is utilized; otherwise 
I=(|0〉 〈0|+|1〉 〈1|) operation is utilized. And then Alice 
and Bob use the Z‑basis {|0〉,|1〉} to measure each par‑
ticle and obtain Ra and Rb, respectively. They calculate 
R = Ra ⊕ Rb and send R to TP.
Step 3. TP makes the Bell measurement on the third, 
four particles sequence, if the result is |Φ±〉, Rt = 0; if the 
result is |Ψ±〉, Rt = 1. After that, TP calculates the bit‑wise 
exclusive‑OR operation between R and Rt, if the result is 
‘0’, then x = y; otherwise x ≠ y.
In the superdence coding QPC, the core issue is how to 
select the appropriate unitary operator according to the 
players’ secret message. The chosen unitary operator will 
be used to encode these secret messages into quantum 
Figure 2: Process of the superdense coding QPC.
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EPR pairs of | Φ+〉, and take particle 1 (2) to form their 
own first (second) particles sequence S A1 ( ),S
A
2  S
B
1 ( )S
B
2  
and ST1 ( ),S
T
2  respectively.
Step 2. Alice and TP prepare an order N EPR pairs 
sequence of | Φ+〉 once again, and these sequences are 
used to check eavesdroppers. Alice (TP) inserts the first 
and second particles of N EPR pairs into sequences 
S A1 ( )S
T
1 and S
A
2 ( ),S
T
2  respectively. Afterward, they 
exchange the new S A2 ,  S
T
2 sequences.
Step 3. After received all particles, Alice and TP perform 
eavesdropper checking. If they confirm there is no eaves‑
dropper, Alice performs Bell‑basis measurement on two 
corresponding particles and gets Rj
A  from measurement 
result. If measurement result is | Φ+〉(|Φ−〉, |Ψ+〉, |Ψ−〉), 
then Rj
A  is ‘00’(‘01’, ‘10’, ‘11’). Then, the two correspond‑
ing particles in TP’s sequence are collapsed into one of 
four Bell states.
Step 4. Bob and TP perform the similar process as 
Step 2 and 3, respectively. Finally, They get Rj
B  and Rj
C ,  
here R r rj
C
j
C
j
C= ( )1 2 .
S t e p  5 .  A l i c e  a n d  B o b  c a l c u l a t e 
R R x R y r rj j
A
j j
B
j j j= ⊕( )⊕ ⊕( ) = ( )1 2 ( 1  ≤  j  ≤ N / 2 ) , 
and send the result  R j to  TP.  TP calculates 
R r r r rj j
C
j j
C
j
N
= ⊕( ) + ⊕( )( )
=
 
∑ 1 1 2 2
1
2/
, and send R to Alice 
and Bob, if R = 0, then x = y; otherwise x ≠ y.
In the entanglement swapping QPC protocols, the secret 
messages can be encrypted in quantum cryptography or 
superdense coding method, and the different key point is 
that this kind of protocols utilize quantum entanglement 
swapping characteristic to perform the comparison task. 
Speaking in detail, it can product nonlocal entanglement 
correlation by measuring the remote unrelated particles, 
and this nonlocal correlation will be used to realize the 
private message comparison. The efficiency of entangle‑
ment swapping QPC may not be ideal, but it plays a very 
important role in some certain conditions, e.g., there is 
no available quantum channel between the communica‑
tion players. Moreover, it has a significant advantage: 
The particles carrying the secret messages only need 
one‑way transmission, so it is feasible to implement in 
the one‑way quantum computer [30,31].
5. Discussions and Perspectives
The QPC of equal information is only the simplest 
form of QPC. With the deepening research of QPC, 
multi‑party quantum private comparison (MQPC) and 
quantum private comparison in size (SQPC) have been 
states, and we can get comparison result by measuring 
these quantum states. Compared with the quantum 
cryptography QPC, the superdense coding QPC has a 
high efficiency, and it directly uses the quantum chan‑
nel to transmit the secret messages, which greatly exerts 
the unconditional security of quantum cryptography. 
Therefore, to some extent, the superdense coding QPC is 
a special application of quantum direct communication 
(QDC) [25‑27] in the private information comparison 
field.
4. Entanglement Swapping QPC
Entanglement swapping [28,29] plays a very impor‑
tant role in quantum information. Through entangle‑
ment swapping, one can entangle particles that do not 
even share any common past. Suppose the initial state 
is | Φ+〉12⊗|Φ
+〉34, here | Φ
+〉 is defined in Equation (2). 
After the Bell measurements on the pair of particle 1 and 
3, the pair of photon 2 and 4 will be entangled.
Φ Φ Φ Φ Φ Φ
Ψ Ψ Ψ Ψ
+ + + + − −
+ + − −
⊗ = +
+ +
12 34 13 24 13 24
13 24 13 24
1
2
(
 (4)
When the outcome of Bell measurement of particle 1 
and 3 is | Φ+〉, the Bell state of remaining photons must 
be | Φ+〉.
In 2012, Liu et al. [14] presented a QPC protocol based 
on four‑particle χ‑Type states entanglement swapping. 
Recently, Liu et al. [15,16] proposed QPC protocols based 
on Bell states and triplet GHZ states, respectively. Tak‑
ing Bell states as an example, the brief procedures of an 
entanglement swapping QPC protocol can be included 
as follows. [Figure 3].
Step 1. Suppose that Alice and Bob agree that | Φ+〉, |Φ−〉, 
|Ψ+〉, |Ψ−〉 represents information ‘00’, ‘10’, ‘10’, ‘11’, 
respectively. Alice, Bob and TP prepare an order [N/2] 
Figure 3: Process of the entanglement swapping QPC.
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gradually aroused the researchers’ attention. Taking 
MQPC as an example, it is more versatile and practi‑
cally valuable. Obviously, you can utilize the above 
two‑party comparison protocols to realize multi‑party 
comparison. However, with the increase of the players’ 
scale, the efficiency will drop quickly, in the worst case, 
the number of comparison is n (n − 1)/2, so the protocol 
for multi‑party comparison needs to be reconsidered 
and redesigned. Recently, a research group has pro‑
posed a MQPC protocol based on multi‑particles GHZ 
states [32], which allows n players to compare their 
own private information and get the result within one 
comparison execution. Besides, for SQPC, it is significant 
in some practical application. Due to the comparison, 
result may be greater or less or equal; it is difficult to 
realize by using the previous two‑dimensional quan‑
tum state. As we all known, the quantum particle has 
the natural multi‑dimensional characteristic and the 
high‑dimensional quantum state shows greater capac‑
ity than two‑dimensional quantum state. Taking Bell 
state as an example, the capacity of d‑dimensional Bell 
state is log2d times than its two‑dimensional form; thus, 
the high‑dimensional quantum state can be applied to 
complex calculations, including SQPC [33,34]. So far as 
we know, there is no relevant publication for the MQPC 
in size, which involves MQPC and SQPC into one.
Being the foundation of quantum secure computation, 
QPC has extensively application prospect, such as 
quantum multi‑party summation, quantum voting, and 
quantum auction. Recently, Chen et al. has proposed a 
multi‑party quantum summation protocol [35] based 
on multi‑particle GHZ states, which allows a group of 
mutually distrustful players to perform the summation 
computation. In order to satisfy the privacy condition, 
the quantum anonymous voting [36,37] was proposed to 
implement tasks related to secret voting and maintain‑
ing the anonymity of the voters. Quantum auction is 
another kind of application in commerce business, which 
includes three transactional types: The ascending‑bid 
auction (English auction) [38], the descending‑bid auc‑
tion (Dutch auction), the first‑price sealed‑bid auction, 
and the second‑price sealed‑bid auction (Vickrey’s 
action) [39,40]. Because quantum entanglement is not 
observable by others, the bidders who share the entan‑
gled states can arrange for correlations among their bids, 
thus non‑winning bids are never revealed. Quantum 
English auction and quantum Vickrey’s action have 
already been studied by some researchers. However, 
because Dutch action is non‑commonly used in com‑
merce, there is no relevant research up till now.
Up to date, QPC and other relevant issues have attracted 
more and more attentions of researchers, and also 
achieved some outcomes in theory. We can predict they 
will continue to be developed by leaps and bounds in the 
next few decades. Maybe, the following three directions 
will become the research mainstream in the future work,
• Improvement of existing quantum secure computa‑
tion issues Nowadays, all kinds of QPC, quantum 
multi‑party summation, quantum voting, and quan‑
tum auctions have been proposed, taking security 
and efficiency into consideration, there are probably 
many aspects to be improved
• Other complex QSMC Such computations, where 
secrecy is an issue, include joint data base computa‑
tion, private and secure database access, joint signa‑
tures, joint decryption, and any other multi‑party 
computation [41]
• Formalism analysis of quantum secure computation 
The security analysis of quantum secure computa‑
tion is mostly based on the non‑formalized analytical 
method (also called attack verification method). In 
the security analysis, some given attacks are adopted 
to assault the present protocols; thus, this kind of 
analytical method has some shortcomings: (a) The 
method lacks strictness, for it is impossible to adopt 
all kinds of attacks. (b) It can be proven to be se‑
cure against the known attacks, but cannot confirm 
whether there is no flaw in the whole protocol. As 
we know, the automated verification techniques [42] 
have made important achievements in the classical 
computation fields, which have already been exten‑
sively used to analyze the security of the protocols. 
Having made use of the present quantum formalism 
outcomes, such as quantum logic [43] and quantum 
program language [44], we can introduce the formal‑
ism analysis into the quantum secure computation. 
I think, it is a most worthwhile research topic.
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